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Summary 
The upward trend of European unemployment begs many questions, the most basic of 
which is why unemployment continues to climb after twenty-five years. Adverse shocks, rigid 
labor market institutions, and their interaction are used to explain this persistence and the 
differences in individual country experiences. 
While these models do indeed answer both questions to some extent, they assume that 
institutions predate the rise in unemployment, often treating them as static. By compiling 
extant data series and constructing my own, I find that this assumption is weak, and that the 
evolution of institutions is far from static. 
I create and estimate a new dynamic panel of 20 OEeD countries with three empirical 
specifications, and uncover several significant results. First, the tax burden on labor appears to 
have a very strong and positive relationship with unemployment rates, implying that the tax 
structures of a country are an important indirect mechanism driving joblessness. Second, the 
unionization level shows a significant amplification effect; that is, high union density 
exacerbates adverse shocks to employment. Third, restrictions on firm hiring and firing seem 
to have the opposite effect - more protection reduces the impact of shocks. I also find 
evidence that both union/employer coordination and benefit duration affect unemployment 
rates significantly. 
My thanks to Greg Hess, Justin Wolfers, Steve Nickell, Richard Layard, Miriam Golden, Michael Wallerstein, 
Peter Lange, Eduard Pelz, Franz Traxler, and Luca Nunziata for their assistance and advice. 
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In the late 1960s, rates of unemployment in Europe lay below three percent. After the 
first oil shock of the 1970s, these rates rose dramatically, hitting 11 percent in 1985 before 
dipping back to eight percent by 1990. The United States likewise saw its unemployment rate 
rise in the wake of the 1960s productivity boom, but it recovered after 1992, and indeed has 
created concern that unemployment is too low. Meanwhile Europe's number of unemployed 
has continued to grow through the 1990s. Figure 1 and Figure 2 shows broad trends in 
unemployment rates before 1992. 
Figure 1. The Evolution of Unemployment 1960-1992 
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Conventional wisdom ascribes this disparity to an idea relatively common to the 
macroeconomic analysis of labor markets. Disturbances in market equilibrium are caused by 
an exogenous shock that moves the unemployment level either up or down. Since the shock 
moves the market out of the long-run equilibrium, the effect will eventually die out. However, 
certain factors may either prolong or shorten the period in which the market is out of 
equilibrium, defining the persistence or propagation of the shock. Therefore, even if the initial 
shock is small, strong rigidities in the market may prevent a return to equilibrium for a long 





















0.000 .L.~~~£ __ ~.....:.-__________ .....:.-~ 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 





~_~_ United Kingdom 
USA 
__ , ..... Average 
Analysis of unemployment differences often takes this tact. Shocks are seen as moving 
the market out of equilibrium, and the inherent rigidities of labor market institutions are 
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blamed for the lengthy persistence. Institutions are then seen as the culprit in explaining cross-
country differences. 
Early explanations for the unemployment experienced by Europe and the United States 
focused on the two oil price shocks and subsequent disequilibria in labor markets. These were 
confounded when the turbulence resurfaced in Europe in the early 1990s, with the 
unemployment rate again moving above ten percent. To further complicate the picture, 
unemployment rates in comparably wealthy countries, most notably in the United States, fell to 
remarkable lows. Building off of the theory of the past 20 years, new frameworks arose to 
explain the unemployment problem. These avenues moved beyond obvious shocks, searching 
for subtler influences and, perhaps more importantly, cultivating the idea that unemployment 
was largely a persistence effect of rigid labor market institutions. If such was indeed the case, 
then it would also quite possibly explain the unemployment differences among European 
countries and the United States. 
The recent literature, most notably work by Steve Nickell, Olivier Blanchard, and 
Justin Wolfers, attempts to explain cross-country disparities using cross-section institutional 
data. The results largely indicate that unemployment rates are strongly affected by a country's 
social framework. 
The Hypothesis 
There is a gap in the current thinking. The recent literature notes that knowledge of the 
nature of institutional effects in labor markets is limited because the major data for institutions 
occurs largely in cross section. Little effort has been put into the construction of a time-variant 
panel for institutional variables. Thus, econometric specifications try to explain the role of 
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institutions in cross-country variation given static variables. For example, recent work by 
Nickell (1997) and Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) use institutional data that comes from an 
averaged five-year period in of 1989-1994. 
This is problematic because the cross-section can hide important dynamic information. 
The use of static institutions essentially relegates them to the country effect, making them only 
useful in explaining cross-country heterogeneity of unemployment rates. Ifunemployment 
institutions really do create a persistence effect, then the cross-section is insufficient 
information. The measure may very well lack the components that might be necessary to trace 
the dynamic adjustment path of unemployment. That is, cross-section data fails to capture the 
full nature of institutions, and thus the full nature of any persistence effect. Moreover, static 
institutions allow for no change in the legislative structure, expressly prohibiting the institution 
itself from acting as a shock (i.e. a drastic change in a short amount of time). 
The hypothesis is then a simple one, originally proposed by Blanchard and Wolfers 
(1999) and fully implemented by this analysis. What if institutions are allowed to vary over 
time? That is, can time-variant effects in institutions help explain the differences in 
unemployment between Europe and the United States? Current explanations of the 
differences, based on static institutions, ignore three potential causes of difference. 
• Institutional change itself could be a shock to the labor market. For example, a sudden 
reduction in benefit duration (i.e. the length oftime for which it granted unemployment 
benefits) could kick long-term unemployed (who years ago exited the labor market) 
into the job market, thus increasing unemployment measures. 
• The variance of institutions could better explain persistence. Timing is crucial in 
determining whether or not the variables are really the keystone. If Germany's benefit 
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duration was increased ten years after total factor productivity began to decline, the 
persistence effect should be smaller then if the increase occurred after only a year. 
• Institutional change has a direct bearing on the initial impact of exogenous shocks. If 
the benefit duration is lengthened to compensate for unemployment caused by a total 
factor productivity decline, then the unemployment shock will likely be worsened. 
The Contribution 
My contribution exists on two levels: I create a new panel of time-variant institutional 
data and I find that the fresh data offer several surprising insights as to the relationship of 
institutions and the unemployment rate. 
I compile a dynamic panel for 20 OEeD countries over 33 years, constructing data 
series from primary sources and culling other series from complete and partial data sets 
collected by other economists, political scientists, and sociologists. An examination of the data 
and sample statistics indicates that institutions are not static, but rather show significant 
variation over time. This runs contrary to past analyses, which often simply assumed that 
recent institutional measures were a good proxy for past ones. 
I use the new panel to estimate a series of specifications aimed at uncovering whether 
allowing institutional time variation yields new evidence for the nature of the relationship 
between labor institutions and unemployment rates. The first test is a simple regression to 
dissect the general nature of the association. Then I look.at two separate specifications to 
examine the difference between institutions which directly affect unemployment (termed 
additive effects) and institutions which indirectly exacerbate adverse shocks to the 
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unemployment rate (termed amplification effects). Finally, I combine the two effects into a 
single equation. 
Table 1 compares this methodology to recent analyses, Nickell's 1997 survey paper, 
which summed up the present thinking of institutional effects, and Blanchard and Wolfers' 
1999 publication, which pioneered the empirical testing of institution/shock interaction. 
I uncover strong evidence for several propositions regarding the implications of time-
variant institutions. 
• The tax burden on labor (often called the tax wedge) has a large and positive 
correlation with unemployment. This effect appears to be additive, meaning 
that the tax wedge does not act through a shock mechanism, but is rather 
associated with a direct influence. 
• The level of union density in a country is important in determining the 
magnitude of an unemployment shock. Countries with a high density are 
inclined to also see shocks persist for much longer. 
• How much a country legislates firm hiring and firing (termed employment 
protection) is likewise a significant factor in the persistence mechanism, albeit 
in the opposite direction. High protection seems to dampen the duration of a 
shock, leading a country to recover more quickly. 
Other institutions show weaker evidence of a relationship with unemployment rates, 
with some ambiguity clouding the results. 
• The coordination of unions and employers (referred to simply as coordination) 
evinces a positive correlation with unemployment rates. The greater the 
insularity of the bargaining process, the greater the unemployment rate. 
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However, it is unclear whether this effect occurs as essentially additive, or if it 
acts as a shock "megaphone". 
• There is weak evidence that benefit duration moves positively with 
unemployment rates, but the correlation is also ambiguous as to whether the 
association is one of addition or amplification. 
These results speak to the strength of this analysis compared to the others outlined in 
Table 1. Previous work using static institutions fails to capture the time effects; that is, 
whether institutional variation is itself a shock, whether changes in institutions change the 
persistence effect, etc. Therefore, the best approximation of the unemployment/institution 
relationship is altered due to missing data. By incorporating most of the missing series, this 
paper shows that several institutional effects are quite larger than previous work by Nickell 
(1997) or Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) made apparent - namely the enormous effects of the 
tax wedge, unemployment protection, and labor union density. Moreover, introduction of the 
time-variant data downplays the importance of some prior results in the same papers - in this 
case, the power of benefit duration. Finally, earlier evidence of a negative correlation between 
coordination and unemployment is repudiated. 
In another departure from previous analyses, this paper estimates each specification 
with a basic firewall against the endogeneity often argued in labor market institutions' relation 
with unemployment. The estimations are also unique to prior work in that they attempt to 
minimize issues of serial and spatial correlation. 
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The extant literature can be dissected into three distinct episodes: initial explanations 
that relied on the commodity shocks of the 1970s, subsequent ideas about the effects of labor 
market institutions and other rigidities, and the present analysis that combines new 
conceptualizations of shocks with the persistence effects of institutions. 
Initial Explanations - Shock Analysis 
Sharp increases in unemployment impacted the European continent as a direct 
consequence of the recession induced by the 1972-73 commodity price explosion. Searching 
for the unexpected crisis' explanation, many economists seized on the relative oil price 
increase, gradually developing it into a broader decreased productivity analysis. In addition. 
research also turned to the role of aggregate demand, an aspect that has lost some significance 
in the overall story. Prodded by the frenetic work on institutions of the 1990s. some of the 
literature is returning to the shock concept, proposing alternative reasons for the initial 
unemployment episode. 
Relative Price Shocks 
The rise in commodity prices caused a general decline in terms of trade, which in tum 
precipitated a slowdown in the gro'W1h of real wages. This drop-off occurs because if firms are 
to maintain the same profit levels in the face of increased relative prices for raw materials (a 
decline in factor productivity), they must slow wage grovv1h. If for some reason firms lag 
behind in assimilating this new information, wages increase too quickly, sparking 
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that the fall in productivity was responsible for the majority of the increase. Besides sharing 
the same mechanism for increasing unemployment as a rise in relative prices, a drop-off in 
productivity also ensures lower future wages. Work by Manning (1992) argues that ifit takes 
time to find a job, then the lower rates in the future will likewise decrease the opportunity cost 
of being unemployed.3 With this in mind, wage negotiations will demand a higher wage 
presently, resulting in increased unemployment. 
Aggregate Demand Shocks 
When inflation is low or middling, decreasing inflation will often imply an 
unemployment rate above equilibrium; increasing inflation indicates a rate below equilibrium. 
Blanchard (1999) notes that the change in inflation has been negative since the 1970s, 
reflecting an equilibrium above the actual unemployment rate. He argues that this is because 
macroeconomic policy delayed a portion of the unemployment increase from the 1970s to the 
1980s. Modigliani, et al (1998) note that since evidence points to a short-run Phillips curve 
that is flatter at lower inflation, small declines in inflation (as, for example, in the 1990s) 
would result in large splits between actual and equilibrium unemployment. This then implies a 
sizable shortfall in aggregate demand. 
A disflationary process, as in the first half of the 1980s, will also result in 
unemployment if there is nominal inertia in wages/prices or if the effects are unexpected. 
Bruno and Sachs (1985) find that there is substantial nominal wage inertia for North America 
and little to none for Europe. Grubb, Jackman, and Layard (1983) find a similar result. While 
2 It is also interesting to note that the non-EC countries experienced a decline of only 2.2 percent, possibly 
indicating a reason for intra-Europe differences. Bean (1994) summarizes this analysis. 
3 The idea being that the present discounted value of the wages is lower than if the productivity decline has not 
occurred. 
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these results are oft disputed, no study has yet shown that, all things equal, Europe contains a 
relatively high level of nominal wage inertia. Therefore, most research tends to discount the 
role of the disflationary process in European unemployment. 
Additional Shocks 
Other shocks have been examined more recently. Blanchard (1999) argues that the 
lower real interest rates in the 1970s suppressed the full effects of the productivity shocks, 
leaving Europe open to a larger effect when interest rates rose in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. 
Blanchard (1997, 1998) also makes the controversial proposition that a decline in labor 
hoarding has increased the marginal product of labor relative to wages, meaning that the 
increase in capital share that Europe has seen is permanent. This implies that labor demand 
fell over the past decade. Cabellero and Hammour (1997) offer opposing analysis, claiming 
that the shares will return to their previous levels in the long run. 
Further Explanations - Static Institutions and Rigidities 
With the oil shocks of the 1970s long past, Europe again experienced a relentless rise in 
unemployment rates. Having already noted several problems with early attempts, economists 
began to focus on the relationship between institutions and unemployment. Initial analyses of 
institutions concentrated on how institutions affected the impact of shocks. For example, 
Bruno and Sachs (1985), concentrated heavily on the nature of collective bargaining and how it 
altered the response to shocks. Similar goals can be found in Calmfors (1994), a paper 
representative of a body that focused on the structure and coordination of bargaining. Taylor 
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(1980, 1998) initiated a wealth of debate as to whether staggered bargaining can make 
disinflation more difficult and prolong the effect on unemployment from unanticipated 
deflations. 
As European unemployment continued unabated into the 1990s, research turned from 
the qualitative dimension to the time aspect. More attention was brought to how labor market 
rigidities could cause a shock to persist for far longer than it would have in the absence of such 
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institutions. If those bodies changed in the past couple of decades, they could potentially have 
drastically altered the reaction of Europe to shocks. While a number of institutions in Europe 
are roughly the same as they were in 1970, the mere presence of a social safety net could 
potentially affect the duration of an unemployment spell. Lindbeck (1995) noted that it often 
takes a substantial amount of time for people to use the social institutions they're entitled to, 
meaning that even if an institution hasn't changed, it can still significantly affect the path of 
unemployment. 
A storm of proposals followed in the wake of the unemployment resurgence of 1990s, 
with everything from the minimum wage to housing as an indication of labor mobility being 
considered as a potential persistence mechanism. Nickell (1997) distilled the debate down to 
eight institutions: the tax wedge, active labor market policy, employment protection, the 
benefit replacement rate, benefit duration, union density, union coverage, and employer/union 
coordination. I discuss each of these in tum. 
The Tax Wedge 
The concept of the tax wedge, or the tax burden on labor, straddles the distinction of 
shock and institution. The term "wedge" refers to the way in which taxes insert a difference 
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between the labor costs for firms (producer wages) and the net income for workers 
(consumption wages). A tax increase likewise broadens this gap, giving people less incentive 
to work as their consumption wage drops farther and farther below the producer wage. Indeed, 
firms also have a decreased incentive to hire workers, their wage being significantly higher 
than the worker wage they ultimately get. Wage pressures increase, causing a rise in 
unemployment. 
Early work on tax rates predates the wave of institutional analysis, with much of the 
nomenclature treating taxes as a shock. That definition has since evolved, with tax rates now 
seen more as institutions. The OECD (1994) noted that the structure of the taxes (that is, the 
nature of the tax -consumption, payroll, etc.) is insignificant in determining the effect on 
unemployment. Many authors point to the tax wedge as a potential cause of unemployment in 
Europe, including Andersen (1988), Calmfors and Nymoen (1990), and Padoa Schioppa 
(1990). These earlier writings hypothesize that the increase of taxes in the 1970s and early 
1980s resulted in a shock to employment via the wage mechanism. More recent work by 
Blanchard (1999) and Nickell (1997) includes the tax wedge as another institution, acting as a 
persistence factor. 
Active Labor Market Policl 
Active labor market policy is usually thought of as the ratio of fiscal expenditures on 
unemployment programs, job skills development, job search assistance, etc. to the number of 
unemployed. This results in a measure of active labor market assets per unemployed person, 
and has been measured in recent years by the OECD's Employment Outlook 1995. 
4 The OEeD defines a country's active labor market policy in five parts: entrepreneurship assistance, job search 
aid, wage subsidies for regular employment, job training, and the creation of temporary jobs. 
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Presumably, the more money a government is actively spending on its unemployed (that is, not 
just keeping meeting basic needs with benefits), the easier ajob transition is and the smaller 
the persistence of any shock. 
Studies of active labor market policies largely exist on a micro level, as seen in a 
survey by the OECD (1993). Relatively little work exists on the macroeconomic side, with 
most authors concluding that any policy effect is ambiguous at best (see for example Holmlund 
and Linden, 1993, or Jackman, 1994). Calmors and Forslund (1991) and Calmfors and Lang 
(1995) showed that a macro active labor policy is not linked to the results of micro studies; 
indeed, programs may be offset by rising wage pressures or substitution between groups of 
unemployed. Richardson (1997) attempted to eliminate this ambiguity, modeling the policy as 
a transition rather than a state. Surprisingly, he found that active labor market policy could 
potentially reduce the equilibrium unemployment level. 
Employment Protection 
Employment protection is an index of the constraints placed on individual firm's hiring 
and firing. As employment protection increases, turnover declines but unemployment duration 
increases. The ultimate effect on the unemployment rate is the subject of some debate. 
Lazear (1990) compiled differences in regulations of advance notice and severance, 
producing panel estimations that revealed a positive correlation between such protections and 
unemployment. The OECD (1999) constructed a baseline measure of current protection in 
Europe and the United States. Building off of the OECD work, Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) 
propose a fusion of the OECD numbers and earlier work, developing a rough contiguous series 
for employment protection. Nickell (1997) also finds a positive relationship between 
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unemployment and employment protection. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Mortenson 
and Pissardes (1997) evaluate other models of employment protection and unemployment. 
However, work by Bertola (1990) indicates that employment protection provisions 
have no significant empirical correlation with long-run unemployment levels. Bertola and 
Rogerson (1996) postulate that this may mean that Lazear's findings were actually reverse 
causation. 
Benefit Replacement Rate and Benefit DurationS 
The benefit replacement rate is measured as the amount of pre-tax unemployment 
benefits and assistance divided by the pre-tax wage. Economic theory indicates that countries 
with higher replacement rates will see shocks persist longer. As workers are knocked out of 
jobs because of the shock, they have less incentive to seek new jobs if their compensation is 
close to what their wage was. 
Benefit duration is simply the number of years for which unemployment benefits are 
available. Like the replacement rate, the duration of benefits will also have a negative 
persistence effect. The longer unemployed workers can draw benefits, the less their incentive 
to seek a new position quickly. This may then in turn exacerbate unemployment further, as 
workers who wait to get new jobs find their skills outdated and their positions usurped by 
newer laborers. 
The OEeD (1994) constructed a series for the average replacement rate dating back to 
1960. Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) expand on this work, creating series both for the first 
year of benefits and for an average of the second to fifth years. They find a positive correlation 
5 Benefits are the direct remittance a worker receives while unemployed. 
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between benefits (both replacement rate and benefit duration), as do Nickell (1997) and 
Layard, et al (1991). 
Mortenson (1986) gives a comprehensive overview of a vast microeconometric 
literature that positively links unemployment benefits and unemployment duration.6 However, 
many studies (for example Kieffer and Neumann, 1989) offer evidence that this effect is rather 
small, to the point of being negligible. The macroeconomic evidence is likewise small-
Adams and Coe (1990) find that a one percent increase in the replacement rate of the United 
States raises the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) by only .05 
percent. Nickell (1997) and Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) find a significant, moderately sized 
positive effect of benefit duration on unemployment rates. 
Union Coverage and Density7 
Economic theory indicates that increased union coverage or membership will make the 
labor market more rigid, slowing response to shocks. Outside of the early work on union 
bargaining, research has focused on the extent to which a work force is given the power to 
bargain for wages. Again, Bruno and Sachs (1985) offer some of the original analysis, but 
subsequent studies by Nickell (1997) and Layard, et al (1991) reflect a positive relationship 
between coverage and unemployment. Additional evidence indicating the same result comes 
from OECD (1997). 
6 These models form the foundation for labor search theory, a robust literature in and of itself. Certain elements 
of search models are relevant to cross-country analysis, particularly in the case of labor-mobile regions. However, 
this is outside the bounds of this inspection. 
7 Union density refers to union membership divided by active labor force or some similar measure. Union 
coverage indices attempt to capture the largely European phenomena of union negotiations that cover an often 
sizable non-union proportion of the population. 
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Lindbeck and Snower (1988) propose that unions raise unemployment by creating a 
cadre of insiders. These insiders essentially form a non-competitive market in the economy, 
one in which the unemployed are not allowed to bid down wages. These outsiders stay 
unemployed for longer due to the higher wages. Consistent evidence (for example, Fuchs, 
Krueger, and Poterba, 1988) confirms this result, implying that higher union density keeps 
wages artificially high and therefore keep unemployment above equilibrium. 
CoordinationS 
On one hand, economic theory indicates that the more coordinated union/management 
negotiation is, the quicker and more responsive any contracted wage will be adjusted. If many 
firms are individually negotiating with many workers, there is an incentive to try to one-up the 
competition, thereby resulting in a slower actual response to shocks. However, coordination 
may exacerbate the problem of the insider/outsider disjunction outlined by Lindbeck and 
Snower (1988). The higher coordination may actually increase the grip of the insiders on 
wages, making it even more difficult for outsider unemployed to get jobs. 
Early results by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) indicated that the adverse impact of the oil 
price shocks were offset more in countries with higher coordination. Layard, et al (1991) 
construct an index of coordination for both sides of the bargaining table. Coordination is found 
to have a negative relationship with unemployment, a result later confirmed by Nickell (1997), 
Layard and Nickell (1997), and Blanchard (1999). The ability of coordination to offset the 
negative impact of unions is also noted earlier, most notably in Calmfors (1994). 
8 Coordination refers to the ability of employers or unions to move together, thus avoiding overselling or 
undercutting that distorts the economy. 
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Other Institutions 
Many other institutions are thought to affect unemployment in some way, but empirical 
analysis of most finds them to be insignificant. However, two of these factors are worth more 
explanation: labor mobility and the minimum wage. 
Oswald (1996) finds a positive correlation between house ownership and 
unemployment. He conjectures that people are less willing to move when they own a house, 
thus ultimately making labor more immobile and increasing unemployment. While results are 
preliminary, empirical analysis of Oswald's proposition is tenuous at best, largely because of 
the unstable theoretical grounds on which it rests. Oswald essentially postulates that home 
ownership is a proxy for labor immobility, an ephemeral concept affected by numerous other 
factors. Notably, the United States continues to see a high incidence of home ownership and 
labor mobility, both relative to European countries. Not only are these two facts contradictory 
in a proxy relationship, but the high ownership also would indicate a slower response to shocks 
than more "mobile" European workers. While Oswald's conjecture is potentially useful, the 
results are considered too preliminary for the institutional analysis this paper is concerned with. 
Minimum wage is likewise problematic. While the economic theory is solid, the 
tumultuous nature of such articles as Card and Krueger (1995) reveals little or no consensus as 
to the effects of the minimum wage on unemployment. Moreover, there is an enormous 
endogeneity problem with minimum wage - is it artificial, or is it merely the government 
setting the market-determined minimum as law? . 
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Present Explanations - Shock and Persistence 
The most recent analyses concentrate on the interaction between economic shocks and 
institutional rigidities. The earliest discussion of such interaction is found in Bruno and Sachs 
(1985). Layard, et at (1991) construct some preliminary methods for analyzing such a 
proposal, but Blanchard (1999) systematically works through the various proposals of shocks 
and institutions, finally concluding that the best way to explain European unemployment is to 
develop a synthesized model that describes the interactions between the two. Whereas there 
has been an enormous amount of research on both institutions and shocks, no one has yet 
addressed what happens when the two are combined in a single arena. 
Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) take the first steps on this path, constructing some 
simple regressions to determine whether such analysis is really worthy of further inspection. 
Ultimately, they conclude that the exploration of interactions is potentially extremely lucrative 
for describing the European problem. 
Blanchard and Wolfers are missing two keys to truly developing a way to explain 
unemployment via shock/institution interaction. First, their model of interactions is admittedly 
primitive, descriptive rather than structural. This is more a symptom of the fledgling nature of 
the field than anything else. Second, they construct time-variant series for only a couple ofthe 
institutional variables. It is the latter that I propose to build upon, as outlined in Table 1. 
To truly develop a model of interactions, the data must be as complete as possible. As 
the dynamics of the system increase (in this case by allowing shocks and institutions to affect 
each other in some capacity), all fluctuations can affect the ultimate outcome, and the failure to 
capture those changes is potentially grievous: the variance of institutions could better explain 
persistence; institutional change itself could be a shock; institutional change has a direct 
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bearing on the impact of exogenous shocks. If a change goes unseen, so do the effects of that 
shift on any shock or other institution. By improving the data, I hope to extend this relatively 
new trend in empirical unemployment analysis and possible shed new light on the importance 
of institutions in evaluating cross-country differences. 
Institutional Evolution: 
The Case for Time-Variant Data 
I compiled or constructed time-series for six of the eight major institutions: benefit 
replacement rate, benefit duration, employment protection, coordination, union density, and the 
tax wedge. In most cases, data are for twenty countries, identified by a three-letter country 
code: Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DEN), 
Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Ireland (IRE), Italy (IT A), Japan (JPN), the 
Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), New Zealand (NZL), Portugal (PRT), Spain (SPN), 
Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (SWZ), the United Kingdom (UKI), and the United States (USA). 
That is, the E15 countries and five control OECD countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand, and the United States. 
Benefit Replacement Rate9 
In lieu of the OECD average replacement rate series, I use Blanchard and Wolfers' 
(1999) more refined measure of the maximum replacement rate to trace the evolution of benefit 
generosity since 1960, shown in Figure 3.10 This rate reflects the maximum ratio of pre-tax 
9 My choice of series and measurement issues are explained in the data appendix. A more detailed discussion of 
the OECD construction is located in Appendix SA of the OECD Jobs Study (1994). Justin Wolfers retains notes 
on the Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) alternative. 
10 Refer to the data appendix for notes on the constructions of these figures and averages. 
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unemployment benefits and assistance to pre-tax wage. This usually occurs in the first year of 
benefits, but sometimes appears in later years. 
With the exception of the British Isles, most countries have seen an increase in 
generosity since 1960. Scandinavia jumped markedly in the 1970s and early 80s, while the 
rest of Europe saw a slower rise. The United Kingdom began a sudden and steady decline in 
1980, eventually falling below even the fairly steady rates of the United States and non-
European countries. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Netherlands reimburse their populace the most generously, 
follow by Spain and France. The rest of Europe hovers around a 50% reimbursement rate, 
Figure 3. The Evolution of the Replacement Rate 
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excepting Portugal and Italy. Most countries see about 10% variation, as seen in the standard 
deviations. High variation occurs in both Spain an Portugal, followed by many of the 
24 
Scandinavian countries. In contrast, the United States is relatively stable; out of Europe, only 
Germany's trend approximates this staidness. Table 2 summarizes these sample statistics. 
Benefit Duration 
The duration series is constructed from data collected by the United States Social 
Security Administration and is entirely unique to this paper. 11 It captures the maximum 
duration of benefits in terms of years for an under-50 worker who is subject to means-tested 
assistance. A measurement of six years is the equivalent of unlimited assistance in the index 
scale. The evolution is captured in Figure 4. 12 
Figure 4. The Evolution of Benefit Duration 
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The trend is much flatter than that for the replacement rate, with most countries 
remaining between three and four years. The United States is virtually constant, even more so 
II The data appendix contains infonnation on the construction and alternatives. Nunziata (2000) has developed a 
measure of duration base on OEeD replacement rate series; my issues are addressed in the appendix. 
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than the replacement rate. The Scandinavian countries are below the average, an interesting 
juxtaposition to their higher-than-average replacement rates. Also diverging is the benefit 
duration in the British Isles. While the replacement rate is falling, the duration has stayed 
consistently high for about the last two decades. 
The individual country data in table 3 indicate that many European countries legislate 
unlimited benefit duration, . largely as the result of means-tested assistance programs. The 
variance measures are likely inflated, given that most duration changes are subject to sudden 
changes in unemployment laws. This is exemplified by the high standard deviations of 
Sweden, Finland, and the UK, all of which saw major changes in benefit duration. The 
average variance remains fairly small, at about a quarter of a year. 
Employment Protection 
Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) construct a crude but usable employment protection 
series based on data collected by Lazear (1990) and the OEeD. J3 The index is scaled {1, 4} 
and captures the level of limitations placed on firm hiring and firing; the higher the number, 
the more institutional protection. Figure 5 reflects the index's general trends. 14 
As with benefit duration, there is a negligible trend in the data after 1975. A small 
drop-off begins after 1985, largely led by the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden. 
Before 1975, with few exceptions, most countries experiences a gentle rise in employment 
protection. As with duration and the replacement rate, the United States experienced no trend 
12 Refer to the data appendix for notes on the constructions of these figures and averages. 
13 The OECD is working on a more comprehensive measure of employment protection, but the task is complicated 
by difficulties in comparing legislation across countries. Comments and changes in the data are noted in the 
appendix. 
14 Refer to the data appendix for notes on the constructions of these figures and averages. 
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in the amount of security granted to workers by government. Indeed, all of the sample 
countries outside of Europe have not significantly changed their protection. 
Looking to Table 4, the variation is mostly in Iberia and parts of Scandinavia, namely 
Sweden and Denmark. France and Germany also see a comparatively large deviation, 
although still significantly behind the swings experienced elsewhere. The Mediterranean 
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Coordination is measured by an index developed by Michael Wallerstein (1998).15 It 
indexes the level of bargaining coordination on a {I, 4} scale, with the trends shown in Figure 















6. 16 A larger number indicates a greater degree of coordination between employers and 
employees (usually in the form of unions). 
The average and most countries are located between 2 and 2.5, indicating a moderate 
level of coordination. There is a sizably lower degree of coordination in the non-European 
countries, most notably in the United States. The United Kingdom also falls below the 
European average, with a constant coordination level of 2. 
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Scandinavia again lies largely above the rest of Europe, with considerably more noise than the 
average. The exception is in the mid-1980s, when the path briefly drops. 
In Table 5, one can see that most of the variation is relegated to the continent, 
particularly Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In contrast to other institutions, Sweden does 
16 Refer to the data appendix for notes on the constructions of these figures and averages. 
28 
not drive the Scandinavian variation, but rather Finland and Denmark do. Average variance 
remains small, with many countries experiencing no change in coordination over all 33 years. 
Union Density 
The measure of union density is derived from a database compiled by lelle Visser 
(1996) to facilitate cross-country union comparison. 17 A total density measurement is used, 
which excludes self-employed but retains unemployed and retired members. Figure 7 reveals 
the overall trend in union density. 18 
Figure 7. The Evolution of Union Density 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~*~~~ 








_ Continental Eilrope 
_ United Kingdom 
The non-European countries and the United Kingdom have experienced a decline since 
the late 1970s, with a gentler decline realized in continental Europe. Despite the fall in 
17 The data are also drawn from the set compiled by Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1998). See appendix for a 
discussion of density measures. 
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density, European countries invariably retained a rate around 40%. Again Scandinavia is the 
exception, with unionization rates growing steeply from 1968, reaching almost 90% by the 
time the data end. 
The Northern countries are also responsible for most of the variation in density. 
Sweden, Denmark, and Norway all see deviations from around 10%, matched only by Italy and 
the lowlands - Belgium and the Netherlands. Both Italy and Belgium experienced 
considerable upward unionization trends, while the Netherlands experienced a precipitous 
decrease. Table 6 also shows the overall variation to be smaller, 2.8% across the entire 
sample. 
Tax Wedge 
The tax wedge series is constructed by myself from national accounts data from the 
OECD and derivative statistics from the Center for Economic Performance. 19 The series uses 
worker taxes as a percentage of market price GDP as an indicator of the tax burden. The time 
trends are shown in Figure 8.20 
The tax burden for all groups rise across the sample. Scandinavia increases at a faster 
rate after 1970, but then begins a drop in the early 90s. Non-European countries are below the 
average, although the United States keeps pace with the average until the Reagan 
administration. Thereafter, the tax burden in the States continues to rise, albeit at a slower rate 
than the average. The British Isles also rise more slowly and contain considerably more static 
than the continent. 
18 Refer to the data appendix for notes on the constructions of these figures and averages. 
19 The construction of the series is outlined in the data appendix. 
20 Refer to the data appendix for notes on the constructions of these figures and averages. 
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The variation is rather consistent, remaining around 10% for most countries. Finland, 
Sweden, and Iberia are slightly more chaotic, with around a 15% change for the entire period. 
There is also considerable difference in the means of Europe and the control countries, as 
evinced in Table 7. 
Union Coverage 
Franz Traxler (1996) developed an index for union coverage in 1980 and 1990 by 
anecdotal conversations and data from separate country repositories. Richard Jackman, Steve 
Nickell, and Richard Layard (1991) construct a similar index for 1990 using fragments from a 
number of sources, including Bruno and Sachs (1985). 
However, creating a time-variant series for union coverage remains difficult. Coverage 
by collectively bargained contracts is an ill-defined term, and although qualitative data are 
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useful in cross-section analysis, a rigorously constructed series for comparing across country 
and time is beyond the scope of this analysis?l 
Active Labor Market Policy 
Active policies to increase employment are the subject of many microeconometric 
studies, but there are few extant macroeconomic measures. The OECD (1995) measured 
several active initiatives as a percentage of GDP, data which Nickell (1997) then used to 
compile a cross-section measure. Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) then use this estimate in their 
models of interaction effects. 
Such policies are complicated to extricate from other social assistance measures, and 
the definition of active labor market policy is ephemeral at best. Especially in European 
countries, pilot programs are started and eliminated after a few years, making small but 
significant variations that elude a complete definition. Creating a time-series across 33 years 
and 20 countries is indeed a massive task, and one outside the bounds of this paper. 
Specification of the Model 
The most troubling aspect of institutional analysis lies in the lack of empirical 
framework. Many theoretical models and their empirical implementations exist for a single 
institution, but there are no such couplings when multiple institutions are regressed on 
unemployment rates. Indeed, this gap in the literature makes any attempt to capture the effects 
of time-variant institutions a largely descriptive one. Careful evaluation of the data hints at 
21 Nunizata (2000) has built a data set back to 1960 that relies on single-year 1980 OEeD estimates. I view this 
series as too much conjecture for robust analysis, but the estimates shed some light on the potential path of union 
coverage. A brief discussion is included in the data appendix. 
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interactions, as does narrative political analysis, but there is little in the way of technical and 
rigorous economic precedents. Therefore, the development of an empirical specification 
carries with it a heavier weight than a simple expansion of existing economic groundwork. 
Any analysis that moves beyond the descriptive is venturing into new theoretical groundwork 
as well as fresh empirical insights. 
Past Models 
The most simple model links unemployment institutions directly to unemployment 
rates in a linear regression. Nickell (1997) uses this technique to sketch the broad implications 
of institutions on unemployment rates. 
Ui = 'Zb){u + ei 
where i is a country index,j is an institution index, u is the unemployment rate, and X is the 
vector of institutions. Nickell actually regresses on log unemployment for ease of 
interpretation, using the econometric technique of random effects generalized least squares. 
Another simple descriptive technique is used by Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) in their 
attempt to conjoin shocks and institutions in accounting for unemployment differences. They 
use two empirical specifications, one in which countries share common shocks and another in 
which shocks are allowed to vary across countries. 
The first equation, in which shocks are held constant across countries, is defined in 
simple regression form as: 
Uit = Ci + dt (1 + 'Zjb){u) + eit 
where t is a period index (five years in Blanchard's work), i is a country index,j is an 
institution index, U is the unemployment rate, C is the country effect, and d is the time effect for 
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period t (that is, the common shock). Note that while the model does not incorporate time-
variation in institutions, it can readily be added by making X (the vector of institutions) depend 
on time t. 
A similar model can be specified for shocks that vary across countries. 
Uit = Ci + ('L,k(lkYkiD (1 + 'Ljb)(ij) + eu 
where the notation is identical to the previous expression, except for the addition of Y shock 
vector (k is the shock index) for each country in place for the constant d. Again, the simple 
addition of the t index on X would make the model readily usable for time-variant institutional 
analysis. 
In addition to these basic descriptive models, several general macroeconomic models 
adapt to some degree. One such example is based on the short-run supply curve, or Phillips 
curve. However these models tell us no more about the interaction of institutions and 
unemployment than the descriptive ones, and indeed may confuse the final interpretation. In 
the absence of a good theoretical framework, I opt for simplicity. 
Specifications 
I begin with a simple descriptive specification relating unemployment to a set of 
institutions. Clearly, this method does not result from a well-defined theoretical methodology, 
but rather provides a simple technique for evaluating whether time-variant institutions better 
explain unemployment trends. Time and country dummy variables are introduced to capture 
the panel effects. Lagged unemployment is included to account for long-term steady state 
adjustment and hedge against serial correlation. 
utj ='LCj + 'Ldl + 'Lj3Xtj + 1=1'L4 nUI-1 + etj 
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where t is the time index,j is the country index, i is the institution index, u is the 
unemployment rate, c is the country effect, d is the time effect, X is the vector of institutions, 
and Ut-l is lagged unemployment by I years. 
To simplify the estimation, I subtract out country means, effectively eliminating the 
individual effects. The equation becomes: 
(1) 
where the notation is identical to the former equation.22 
The second specification is an emulation of the common-shock model proposed by 
Blanchard. While also not rooted in a tightly-specified theory of institutional interaction, it 
generally suggests the amplification effects of institutions when interacted with common 
shocks. That is, it can tell us something about whether an institution is associated with a 
reduced or enhanced shock. 
(2) 
where the notation again carries. 
The final model used in this analysis is an attempt to combine both additive and 
amplification effects in a single descriptive relationship. 
(3) 
where the notation is consistent. Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) do not include such a model, 
but the dynamic effect could very well occur on both additive and amplification basis. 
22 Removing fixed effects from dynamic panel models can result in problems with underestimating the 
coefficients on the lagged dependent variables. However, this does not interfere with my primary results. Other 
estimation techniques (not reported), such as differencing the data, do not alter the major findings of the .paper. 
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Estimation Procedure 
I estimate these three equations using sixteen of the twenty countries outlined earlier. 
New Zealand, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain are removed.23 As seen earlier, six time-variant 
series are placed in the institution vector: the maximum replacement rate (maxrrate), 
maximum benefit duration (maxdur), employment protection (emppro), coordination (coord), 
total union density (untotden), and the tax wedge (taxwedge). Union coverage and active labor 
market policy, the other two institutions outlined in Nickell (1997), are eliminated and their 
influence subsumed into the individual effect (as they are fixed effects). 
Assigning an expected sign to some of these variables is problematic. The literature 
outlined above is often contradictory, and the evidence speaks to the problems of 
heterogeneity. For the purpose of this analysis, the expected sign of each of these institutions 
except coordination is positive - an increase in the institution is associated with a rise in 
unemployment. 
Four institutions are expected to have a positive coefficient with relatively little debate 
in the literature. Larger or longer benefits (maxdur and maxrrate) increase the incentive to stay 
unemployed longer by making leisure relatively more attractive. The tax wedge increases the 
burden on workers and raises the firm's producer wage relative to the worker wage, also 
increasing unemployment by virtue of incentive. High union density creates rigid wage 
structures, preventing quick adjustment to shocks and subsequently creating more 
unemployment. 
23 Considering the size of the panel, my primary concern was consistency in data. The best measures for time-
variance in union density and coordination did not include observations for these four countries. Given the 
potential strength of union effects, and the lack of a comparable source, I chose to eliminate them from the set. 
New Zealand's data were also problematic in the tax wedge calculation. 
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However, employment protection and coordination have ambiguous signs in the 
literature - many studies offer conflicting viewpoints. Employment protection increases the 
duration of unemployment, but decreases the flow in and out of unemployment. The net effect 
is a theoretical unknown. For the purpose of this analysis, the duration effect is assumed to be 
larger than the flow effect, effectively resulting in higher unemployment. 
A similar problem exists with coordination - does more planning lubricate a unionized 
market? Or does the coordination merely exacerbate the disparity between insiders and 
outsiders? I choose the former, given that the extant empirical evidence seems to favor this 
approach. Coordination is expected negative; greater centralization theoretically results in a 
wage closer to equilibrium. I multiply coordination by -1 (effectively making it 
uncoordination) so that the expected signs are all positive. 
Several techniques are used to reach an accurate estimation: 
• All three specifications are estimated using instrumental variables, specifically the 
institutional variable at time t lagged by one period and multiplied by the mean 
unemployment rate at time (t - 1).24 Instrumental variables are used to hedge against 
endogeneity issues. The lack of a strong theoretical framework stymies efforts to 
endogenize variables in the specification, but instrumental variables provide a good 
alternative, especially with institutions. Unemployment in period t cannot drive an 
institution from period (t - 1) because the institution has been predetermined. For an 
example, look at the tax wedge. The tax wedge - by itself - has a good fit with 
unemployment. It is argued that as unemployment rises, a given configuration of the 
welfare state starts to cost more. Over the medium run governments tend to balance 
24 The mean unemployment rate at time (t- 1) could be thought of as the aggregate time effect of that particular 
period; that is, the fixed time effect. 
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their budgets, thus taxes probably rise in concert. But if unemployment rises, taxes the 
previous year cannot change to provide a budgetary buffer. 
.. The estimation potentially contains issues of serial correlation. Indeed, Blanchard and 
Wolfers (1999) note that their results would potentially be less significant if they 
compensated for the evidence apparent in their residuals. Preliminary tests on the time-
variant data did indeed indicate that both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity might 
be a factor. Therefore, the reported estimations include four lags of unemployment to 
guard against serial correlation?5 
.. Finally, I also estimate each specification where the standard errors arec robust to 
heteroscedasticity of an unknown form. 
Equation (1) is estimated with simply the instrumental variables. I then utilize non-
linear least squares and non-linear instrumental variables to reestimate (1) in terms of the 
additive time effects of institutions on unemployment rates. Finally, (2) (amplification effects) 
and (3) (both additive and amplification effects) are examined using the same two non-linear 
techniques for comparison. 
Evidence 
Estimation of (1) by instrumental variables produces results summarized in Table 8. 
F our of the six institutional variables are significant, with the tax wedge and employment 
protection highly so. The strongest result indicates that the tax wedge has a strong, positive 
25 The question of serial correlation in dynamic panel studies is indeed a complicated one. In the discussion of 
evidence, a Durbin-Watson statistic is included to give an idea of how the estimations look under non-rigorous 
analysis. However, the DW is considered unreliable when a lagged dependent variable (indeed, in any case in 
which a regressor is correlated with the error term). The Durbin-h test may also be unwise, as pointed out in Inder 
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relationship with unemployment. Employment protection also reveals a tight and (perhaps 
surprisingly) negative relationship with unemployment. The replacement rate shows a weaker 
but still significant negative association, and (un)coordination is likewise related. 
The strength of the tax wedge is positive, with the expected result - an increased 
burden on labor implies a decreased incentive to work and to hire labor, making leisure or 
welfare marginally more attractive. The effect of the tax wedge is enormous, with the 
coefficient five times that of any other institution. 
Employment protection turning up negative embodies the theoretical debate. The 
models imply a smaller flow in and out of jobs, but a longer duration. However, they are silent 
on the effect on the unemployment rate - which side of the net effect is larger, restrictions 
locking workers out or the same restrictions locking workers in? The results of (1) argue for 
the latter, that unemployment protection helps workers retain their jobs. The magnitude is 
much smaller than that of the tax wedge, and even falls below that of the less significant 
replacement rate coefficient. Both the tax wedge and employment protection retain their sign 
and significance when introduced alone against unemployment, pointing to a certain robustness 
of the results. 
More confusing are the signs on the coefficients of the less significant variables. The 
literature provides generally weak results for the replacement rate, with the effect ambling 
between positive and negative depending on the specification or other regressors. However, 
theory seems to indicate that an increase in benefits would decrease the difference between 
wage income and leisure income. While this assuredly increases unemployment duration, it 
also tentatively points to a positive relationship with the unemployment rate. Table 8 indicates 
(1984). Breusch and Godfrey (1981) propose another test, which I also use. The results are less strong than the 
DW, as is to be expected, and there is some question as to whether even this test is applicable to a dynamic panel. 
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that the association is negative, that a rise in benefits is correlated with a decline in 
unemployment. However, the result is mitigated when the replacement rate is regressed alone 
on unemployment - the coefficient keeps a negative sign but becomes insignificant. 
The predicted sign on (un)coordination is more strongly rooted in theory and prior 
results. Coordination will decrease unemployment as wage-bargaining becomes more 
centralized and thus closer to equilibrium wage. However, the analysis reveals a negative sign, 
pointing to a fit where higher coordination (i.e. less uncoordination) results in lower 
unemployment. This supports an insider-outsider story, where the coordination of wage-
bargaining actually locks out non-union workers, resulting in higher and sustained 
unemployment. The tighter the centralization, the greater the schism between insiders and 
outsiders. Like the replacement rate, the coordination figure is rendered insignificant when 
introduced alone on unemployment. 
It is also notable that neither union density nor benefit duration are found to have 
significant effects, either in the combined regression or alone. Jackman, Layard, and Nickell 
(1991) correlate duration strongly with unemployment, and a sizable literature links large 
unions and unemployment. When viewed through the lens of a dynamic panel, however, 
neither variable appears to explain unemployment rates well. 
The non-institutional variables are also important. The high statistical significance of 
the sum of lagged unemployment variables implies that unemployment is markedly explained 
by the rate in previous years. This points to a long-run adjustment effect, meaning that the 
duration of a worker's unemployment may perhaps be as important as original job loss in 
determining next period's chance of unemployment. In addition, the use of a dynamic panel as 
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opposed to a pooled cross-section is indeed important. A test of the time dummies reveals 
them to be quite consequential. 
Finally, the regression fits quite well, with a adjusted R2 of 0.935. The time-variant 
institutional variables and lagged unemployment describe unemployment well over time and 
across countries. 
Robustness of the Estimation 
In looking at robustness, I first divide the data into two periods, using 1977 as my break 
point. In addition, I run (1) on the group of 12 European Countries (The Europe 15, minus 
Portugal, Spain, and Ireland) and using step data for two interpolated series, employment 
protection and the replacement rate.26 Table 9 summarizes the results. 
Overall the original estimation is robust, with alterations to the panel producing no 
sudden shifts in signs or magnitude. Several coefficients either lose or gain marginal 
significance, and the fit of the regression continues to be relatively good. The time dummies 
remain important, and the sum of lagged unemployment variables also retains its 
meaningfulness. 
The tax wedge is several degrees of magnitude more important than any other 
institutional variable across all of the alternative tests. The coefficient also holds on to 
significance, dropping only in the later period of 1977-1992. This period also sees a drop in 
the degree of the coefficient, perhaps implying that the tax burden was less of a factor in 
explaining unemployment than it was pre-1977. 
26 The regression was also run on several other country groups, none of whose results differed significantly from 
those show in the original run of (1). Other tests were also used (dropping a single country, using a different 
break year) without distinction. 
41 
Employment protection follows an inverse trend, jumping in magnitude and 
significance in the early period, but losing both in the later one. The variable becomes less 
significant in the Europe-only sample, and loses meaning altogether in the estimation using 
step data. The latter is somewhat expected, given that the step data for employment protection 
is relatively jagged, averaged over five-year periods. 
The other stepped variable, the replacement rate, also loses its importance in that 
estimation. The rate is a factor in the latter period but not in the earlier one. It gains 
significance in the Europe-only sample, and the coefficient becomes larger (in absolute terms) 
in both alternative estimations where it is starred. 
Coordination becomes inconsequential when the data is split by year, but gains size and 
<significance when the sample is restricted to Europe. It retains minor importance in the step 
analysis, with a negligible change in magnitude. 
Both union density and benefit duration remain statistical nonentities. Union density 
become marginally explanatory in the first time period, and benefit duration follows suit in the 
step data analysis. Neither one shows up in the additional estimations. 
It appears that the original estimation is capturing employment protection effects from 
early in the sample and replacement rate effects from later. Coordination seems significant 
only over all 33 years, particularly in Europe. The tax wedge remains large and strong 
throughout each estimation. 
Interaction Effects 
Taking my cue from Blanchard, I interact the time-variant institutional variables with a 
fixed time effect, emulating unobservable shocks across countries. Table 10 summarizes the 
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results of all three interaction specifications. I look first at the additive effects alone, using 
non-linear analysis with both least squares and instrumental variables. 
A few variables turn up notable results. The tax wedge is again large and highly 
significant, no matter the econometric technique used. An increased tax burden on labor is 
related to a large unemployment rate. Estimation by non-linear least squares produces no other 
interesting regressors, but the instrumental variable method shows benefit duration having a 
weakly significant positive correlation with unemployment and (un)coordination again edging 
negative. 
These results strongly support the importance of the tax wedge noted in the original 
analysis of (1). Less convincing is the consistency of coordination - the present value of 
coordination appears to have little relationship with unemployment, but the lagged 
coordination of the instrument does support the insider-outsider story. However, the surprising 
result on benefit duration is even weaker, though it does support earlier studies linking higher 
benefit duration with larger unemployment rates. 
The additive effects alone also fit well. The adjusted R2 is 0.936 and 0.935 for the least 
squares and instrumental variable estimation respectively. There is also a case to be made for 
amplification effects - institutions either reducing the impact of shocks or boosting the 
magnitude. I examine these amplification effects in isolation by estimating (2) using the same 
two techniques. 
The coefficients are markedly different from the additive equation, indicating that 
different institutions affect the degree to which a shock alters unemployment. Union density 
and employment protection have a sizable impact, and the impressive nature of the tax wedge 
disappears. 
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Union density produces a very large and consequential coefficient, meaning that the 
variable makes shocks to unemployment much worse. This is compatible with the theoretical 
implications of union organization. When a relative price shock or decline in total factor 
productivity boosts unemployment, the rigid nature of unionized markets prevents a rapid 
adjustment of wages, keeping the market out of equilibrium for much longer than if the wage 
was allowed to fall accordingly. 
Likewise, employment protection is also significant, albeit of a somewhat smaller 
magnitude. The effect is negative, implying that countries with more employment protection 
suffer less under an adverse shock. Given the ambiguous literature on employment protection, 
this is difficult to interpret. One reading is that as unemployment is negatively shocked, 
employment protection prevents employers from rapidly jettisoning workers, leaving workers 
in jobs at a lower wage. 
Benefit duration and coordination also appear to be significant in altering the impact of 
a shock. Interestingly, the significance only turns up in the least squares estimation, as 
opposed to the additive importance granted by the instrumental variable technique. The signs 
are as in previous results, with benefit duration marginally significant and positive, and 
uncoordination statistically more important and negative. 
The estimation of (2) is also a good fit to the data. Least squares creates an adjusted R2 
of 0.942, with the instrumental variable method being slightly worse at 0.936. From the results 
of the two single-effect equations, an intriguing story is emerging. The powerful effect of the 
tax wedge seems to be a mostly additive effect, with employment protection and union density 
being associated with the degree by which the unemployment rate is affected by a shock. 
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Coordination and benefit duration straddle the divide, showing significance depending on the 
econometric methodology. Finally, the replacement rate is consistently insignificant. 
To shed light on the relationship between these additive and amplification effects, I 
estimate (3), again utilizing non-linear least squares and non-linear instrumental variables. The 
results are consistent with the independent analysis described above. 
The tax wedge remains the dominant additive effect, showing no indication of any 
impact on the magnitude of outside unemployment shocks. Union density also maintains an 
enormous positive amplification effect, whereas employment protection stays large and 
negative. Neither density nor protection tum up significant on the additive side. 
Less apparent is the nature of benefit duration and coordination. The two variable 
maintain the trend revealed in the individual analysis, with instrumental variables deeming 
them both significant and additive. Conversely, least squares points to an important shock 
effect. The additive evidence is slightly more consequential. 
This ambiguity might point to a dual effect. It is certainly possible that extended 
benefit duration creates an incentive to stay out of the job market; the instrumental variable is 
constructed around a lagged duration, and it is plausible that people base their allocation of 
work and leisure partly on recent (lagged) knowledge of how long benefits are available. 
However, when unemployment is adversely shocked, the present duration laws can act as a 
rigidity, prolonging the readjustment of workers to the new labor market. 
A similar story exists for coordination. Higher coordination exacerbates the schism 
between insiders and outsiders, locking some workers out of labor markets. Therefore, as 
coordination increases, so does the unemployment rate as more workers find themselves in a 
disagreeable position to bargain for wages. Moreover, high coordination creates a coterie of 
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insiders who remain insulated when unemployment is increased via shock. The number of 
insiders is reduced under the shock effect in order to keep wages high, and the shock is thus 
worsened. 
Ultimately, this dual effect may also point to a problem with the specification or 
econometric technique. The only difference between the two sets of results are the 
methodology. However, several strong results - employment protection, the tax wedge, union 
density - point to an internal consistency between the methods. Regardless, the effect of 
coordination and benefit duration is nebulous at best, and deserving of further investigation. 
One anomaly of the combined analysis is the sudden significance of the replacement 
rate's amplification effect in the least squares analysis. While statistically important, the lack 
of robustness with respect to other regressions or methods sheds doubt on the validity of the 
result. Interestingly, the amplification effect is positive, as opposed to the estimation of (1) 
which yielded a negative coefficient. This sign dovetails well with theory - like duration, a 
higher rate of benefits will prolong the effect of any negative shock to unemployment rates. 
Along with the strong results for the tax wedge, employment protection, and union 
density, the combined regressions also retain an excellent fit. The instrumental variable 
method's center R2 is 0.920, and the least squares' is 0.945. Each of the three interaction 
estimations describe over 90% of the unemployment rate. 
Conclusion 
Of course, there is also much yet to be done. There still remains work to be done on a 
dynamic panel, namely the difficult tasks of constructing time-variant series for active labor 
market policy and union contract coverage. In addition, there may be other institutions which, 
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though perhaps unimportant when static, become significant when allowed to vai-y over time. 
The largest issue to come out of this analysis, however, is the development of a specified 
theory of institutional interaction. While there is a sizable theoretical literature with regard to 
individual institutions, little has been done to rigorously define how they interact in aggregate. 
The introduction of time-variant institutions offers strong evidence for several ways in 
which unemployment rates can be altered. Foremost, the contemporary tax burden on labor 
appears to directly effect a country's unemployment rate; the more taxes on labor, the more 
unemployment experienced. Secondly, two institutions indirectly affect unemployment rates 
by either dampening or enhancing the power of adverse shocks. Employment rrotection 
evinces a strong negative amplification effect, drastically reducing the impact of a negative 
shock. Conversely, a high union density exacerbates the time effect, indicating that more 
unionization results in longer, more powerful shock. 
I am also encouraged by the good fit of the regressions, despite correcting for serial and 
spatial correlation as well as endogeneity. While the descriptive of the nature may not come 
from a tightly specified theory of institutional interaction, the quality of the fit points to the 
importance of time-variant institutions in any summary analysis. Allowing time effects 
certainly captures something not seen before in the literature, institutions explaining 
heterogeneity among countries and time periods. 
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Data Appendix 
The estimation analysis is based on a completely new dataset of time-variant 
institutions. Several sources exist for many of these variables, and issues of construction and 
measurement were as important as techniques of specification in developing the final evidence. 
Italics denote variables or titles appearing in tables and charts. Spreadsheets of the primary 
data are available upon request. 
Chart/Table Averages and Groupings 
The evolution charts trace the paths of seven group averages, all produced by a simple 
averaging technique. Average is taken over all 20 countri~s. Modified Average is taken over 
the 16 countries included in the estimations (20 minus Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal, and 
Spain). The E15 refers to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. Non-Europe consists of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the United 
States. Scandinavia includes Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The British Isles 
consist of Ireland and the United Kingdom. Continental Europe refers to the E15 minus 
Scandinavia and the British Isles. 
In instances where data are missing for the omitted four countries, all computations are 
made without those countries. In this case, the British Isles becomes the United Kingdom. 
Note also that the E15 becomes effectively the E12. 
The tables contain the following notation outside of the country codes: AVG is the 
Average; MA VG is the Modified Average; EAVG is the E15 average; CAVG is the Non-Europe 
(control) average; NAVG is the North America Average (Canada and the United States). 
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Unemployment Rates27 
The OECD compiles unemployment rates as measured by the originating countries. In 
addition, standardized rates are estimated using rules developed by the OECD and the ILO. I 
compiled both series from the 1999 OECD Economic Outlook and earlier editions. 
Standardized rates are used, except for Austria, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, and Portugal, 
and Switzerland. Common rates are used for the first five and for Sweden 1960-63. For 
Switzerland I uses the adjusted rates of Jackman, Layard, and Nickell (1991) before 1991, and 
the OECD standardized rates thereafter. 
Replacement Rate28 
OECD replacement rates are collected across three family types, two earnings levels, 
and seven unemployment durations, producing 42 separate gross replacement rates. Eighteen 
rates are usually culled from the data by reducing the duration samples to three - the first year, 
the second and third years, and the fourth and fifth years. The primary replacement rate series 
is then an average over these 18 series. The data are collected on odd years. 
Data appendices to Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) point out that the current OECD 
measure confuses benefit generosity and benefit duration. A country with a relatively high 
benefit reimbursement but limited duration will see the average replacement rate drop, 
distorting the true caliber of unemployment benefits. Likewise, a country with unlimited but 
meager benefits will be also portrayed artificially. 
27 For an assessment of cross-country comparability of unemployment rates, see ILO (1996). Several articles 
argue that the unemployment rate, while perhaps less than desirable for measurement within a country, is useful 
for cross-country comparison. See for example Murphy and Topel (1997). 
28 An excellent discussion of the evolution of benefit systems in the OECD can be found in Chapter 8 of the Jobs 
Study (1994). The Jobs Study also examines issues of the relationship among the replacement rate, duration, and 
employment protection. 
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The alternative measure compiled by Wolfers averages over family types and earnings 
levels, leaving seven series. The maximum replacement rate is then chosen from the seven and 
used as a measure of generosity. I use this measure, and derive two series: one that uses linear 
interpolation to fill in the even years and another that creates a step series, with the even year 
taking on the value of the odd year before it. In the latter case, 1960 takes on the value of 
1961. 
Benefit Duration 
In Social Security Programs Throughout the World, the United States Social Security 
Administration reports on the state of welfare systems in a number of countries every two 
years, including the structure of unemployment benefits. Most countries legislate two levels of 
benefits: unemployment insurance (often limited and related to past earnings) and 
unemployment assistance (often unlimited and means-tested). Since the OEeD makes no 
distinction in constructing replacement rate data, I evaluate the maximum duration as the point 
at which all benefits, including means-tested assistance, would be exhausted. In terms of 
years, this maps onto a {O, 6} index, with 6 interpreted as unlimited duration. The measure is 
for a worker under 50; many European countries maintain a higher duration for the aged which 
would skew the measure upwards. 
In unreported years, I insert data according to the last implemented legislation. If there 
is a value of {6} for 1981 and 1979, then I insert {6} for 1980 if the 1981 report indicates that 
the legislation predated 1980. In the case that legislation occurs in an unreported year, I use 
linear interpolation to insert the value. 
Nunziata (2000) proposes an index {a, I} that estimates average duration as 
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BDAVG = a (BRR2 / BRR]) + (l - a) (BRR4 / BRR]) 
where BRR] is the replacement rate in the first year, BRR2 is the rate for the second and third 
year, and BRR4 is the rate for the fourth and fifth, with a = 0.6. Therefore, if benefits stop after 
one year, the average is 0, and constant benefits are 1. 
I do not use this measure because it 1.) fails to capture the nuances of durations in many 
European countries which are often fractions of years, 2.) blurs duration in the second/third and 
fourth/fifth years, 3.) reports an average, rather than maximum duration, and 4.) relies on a 
relatively arbitrary average to delegate the importance of early benefits. The measure is 
potentially useful, but does not fit the needs of my estimations. 
Employment Protection 
Blanchard and Wolfers (1990) link data from Lazear (1990) and an OECD dataset 
starting in 1985. The Lazear data only include information on severance pay and notice period 
for blue-collar workers with ten years seniority, making the set much narrower than the 
measures of the OECD. The combined database is observed every five years, and is reported 
on a {I, 4} scale, with a higher index number meaning stricter employment protection. 
As with the replacement rate, I create two series, one interpolated and one stepped. The 
step series relies on the older year, meaning that the values for 1961, 1962, 1963, and 1964 will 
equal 1960 and not 1965. 
Coordination 
I use the internally consistent indexing created by Michael Wallerstein (1996) and 
reported in Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1998). The index number accounts for both 
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employer and union coordination, with a higher index meaning a greater degree of 
coordination. The index is reported {I, 4} with 
.. 1 = plant-level wage-setting 
.. 2 = industry level wage-setting 
.. 3 = central wage setting without sanctions 
.. 4 = central wage setting with sanctions 
Other measures of coordination exist, for example in Bruno and Sachs (1985). 
However, Wallerstein's index has the distinct advantage of using the same criteria for each 
year sampled. This facilitates better comparison across years. 
Total Union Density 
Union density is calculated from data provided by Visser (1992) and statistics from the 
OECD Labor Force Statistics. The total union membership series from Visser (which includes 
retired and unemployed but excludes self-employed) is divided by the total dependent labor 
force, or salary and wage earners plus the unemployed. 
Because it includes the retired, the total union density yields a ratio biased upward by a 
small degree. This is an intentional and crude attempt to account for the higher union coverage 
experienced by most European countries. The use of net union density (that is, subtracting out 
retired from the union membership total) will not appreciably change the results of the 
estimations.29 Due to missing or fragmented data, I interpolate the following observations: 
AUS: 1990-1992; SWZ: 1990; USA: 1990-1992. 
Nunziata (2000) constructs a union coverage series based on a OECD cross-section 
from 1980. He interpolates from 1980 to 1995, and then constructs the series before 1980 by 
29 Arguably, coverage matters more than density precisely because many European countries have relatively low 
union densities by very high coverage ratios. This is especially true in France. When the difference is high, it 
makes density a rather poor measure of worker power in the bargaining process. However, the measurement 
issues associated with coverage leave us with density as a crude approximation. 
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1.) calculating the ratio of union coverage to union density in 1980 and 2.) using average 
values of that ratio, time-varying density data, and additional information to create the relevant 
projections. While useful for noting general trends, I view this construction as too tenuous for 
rigorous estimation. 
Tax Wedge 
My base measure comes from the Center for Economic Performance at the London 
School of Economics. The wedge is constructed as: 
taxwedge = tl + t2 + ( tx - sb ) / yq 
where tl is the employment tax rate, t2 is the direct tax rate, tx is indirect taxes, sb is subsidies, 
andyq is gross domestic product at market prices. I use the CEP's base estimates and then fill 
in gaps using the OECD's national accounts data. Because of missing or fragmented data, I 
interpolate the following observations: ADS: 1986-1992; BEL: 1988-1992; NLD: 1990-1992; 
NOR: 1960-1964; PRT: 1991-1992; SPN: 1987-1992. 
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# Institutional Variables 8 7 6 
# Time-Variant 0 2 6 
Econometric Technique Descriptive Descriptive Descriptive 
Add. effects measured? Yes No Yes 
Amp. effects measured? No Yes, Yes 
Both effects measured? No No Yes 
Table 2. Individual sample statistics for the maximum replacement rate 
AUS AUT BEL CAN DNK FIN FRA GER IRE ITA JPN NLD NOR 
Mean 0.208 0.351 0.464 0.527 0.496 0.417 0.586 0.402 0.417 0.118 0.506 0.759 0.436 
Median 0.223 0.352 0.497 0.580 0.518 0.406 0.600 0.395 0.438 0.112 0.505 0.785 0.386 
Maximum 0.270 0.452 0.555 0.692 0.718 0.591 0.654 0.432 0.607 0.283 0.535 0.800 0.620 
Minimum 0.137 0.195 0.297 0.358 0.257 0.246 0.500 0.373 0.275 0.022 0.475 0.700 0.235 
Std. Dev. 0.041 0.070 0.078 0.106 0.165 0.098 0.050 0.020 0.122 0.069 0.020 0.047 0.154 
NZL PRT SPN SWE SWZ UKI USA AVG MAVG EAVG CAVG NAVG 
Mean 0.317 0.285 0.595 0.561 0.383 0.347 0.436 0.430 0.437 0.441 0.399 0.482 
Median 0.318 0.323 0.640 0.680 0.323 0.335 0.435 0.457 0.462 0.469 0.413 0.510 
Maximum 0.425 0.650 0.915 0.846 0.710 0.482 0.460 0.522 0.520 0.553 0.430 0.563 
Minimum 0.267 0.000 0.000 0.216 0.050 0.217 0.380 0.322 0.331 0.301 0.342 0.380 
Std. Dev. 0.042 0.270 0.216 0.251 0.286 0.098 0.018 0.082 0.070 0.100 0.030 0.060 
-------_ .. _ .. -
A VG is the average over all 20 cOllntries, MA VG is the average over the 16 countries used in the econometric estimations, EA VG 
is the average over the Europe 15, CA VG is the average over the jive non-European countries, and NA VG is the average over 
North America. Refer to the data appendix for notes on the construction of these jigures and averages. 
II 
Table 3. Individual sample statistics for the maximum benefit duration 
AUS AUT BEL CAN DNK FIN FRA GER IRE ITA JPN NLD NOR 
Mean 6.000 6.000 6.000 2.584 0.905 1.964 5.083 6.000 6.000 0.626 0.793 4.495 1.161 
Median 6.000 6.000 6.000 0.980 1.000 0.410 6.000 6.000 6.000 0.490 0.820 5.000 1.500 
Maximum 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 1.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 0.990 0.820 6.000 1.500 
Minimum 6.000 6.000 6.000 0.960 0.680 0.410 3.750 6.000 6.000 0.490 0.740 2.360 0.380 
Std. Dev. 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.347 0.147 2.510 1.087 0.000 0.000 0.226 0.038 1.679 0.523 
NZL PRT SPN SWE SWZ UKI USA AVG MAVG EAVG CAVG NAVG 
Mean 6.000 0.875 2.258 2.861 0.401 3.818 0.737 3.228 3.089 3.230 3.223 1.661 
Median 6.000 0.990 1.500 0.820 0.250 6.000 0.750 3.307 3.236 3.181 2.906 0.855 
Maximum 6.000 3.750 3.500 6.000 0.680 6.000 0.750 3.551 3.356 3.766 3.898 3.375 
Minimum 6.000 0.000 1.500 0.820 0.250 1.500 0.690 2.766 2.551 2.721 2.898 0.835 
Std. Dev. 0.000 1.182 0.867 2.570 0.184 2.284 0.025 0.223 0.261 0.274 0.464 1.178 
Refer to table 2 for notes on these figures. 
III 
Table 4. Individual sample statistics/or employment protection 
AUS AUT BEL CAN DNK FIN FRA GER IRE ITA JPN NLD NOR 
Mean 1.000 1.957 2.626 0.600 1.966 2.375 2.136 2.743 0.747 4.097 2.800 2.675 3.066 
Median 1.000 1.907 2.763 0.600 1.930 2.400 2.600 3.240 1.000 4.200 2.800 2.700 3.100 
Maximum 1.000 2.600 3.100 0.600 2.200 2.400 2.950 3.300 1.070 4.200 2.800 2.700 3.100 
Minimum 1.000 1.300 1.329 0.600 1.570 2.190 0.709 0.825 0.000 3.640 2.800 2.490 2.820 
Std. Dev. 0.000 0.595 0.461 0.000 0.200 0.057 0.735 0.844 0.360 0.165 0.000 0.057 0.076 
NZL PRT SPN SWE SWZ UKI USA AVG MAVG EAVG CAVG NAVG 
Mean 1.600 2.643 5.060 2.262 1.100 0.591 0.200 2.112 2.012 2.403 1.240 0.400 
Median 1.600 3.580 5.735 3.000 1.100 0.700 0.200 2.213 2.109 2.538 1.240 0.400 
Maximum 1.600 3.900 6.218 3.600 1.100 0.700 0.200 2.377 2.248 2.756 1.240 0.400 
Minimum 1.600 0.000 3.310 0.000 1.100 0.329 0.200 1.591 1.501 1.709 1.240 0.400 
Std. Dev. 0.000 1.558 1.236 1.475 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.260 0.256 0.347 0.000 0.000 
Refor to table 2 for notes on these figures. 
IV 
Table 5. Individual sample statistics for coordination 
AUS AUT BEL CAN DNK FIN FRA GER IRE ITA JPN NLD NOR 
Mean 3.030 2.000 2.424 1.273 3.455 2.970 2.030 2.000 NA 3.242 1.879 3.091 3.000 
Median 3.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 .4.000 3.000 2.000 2.000 NA 3.000 2.000 3.000 3.000 
Maximum 4.000 2.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 3.000 2.000 NA 4.000 2.000 4.000 3.000 
Minimum 3.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 NA 2.000 1.000 2.000 3.000 
Std. Dev. 0.174 0.000 0.830 0.876 0.905 0.637 0.174 0.000 NA 0.502 0.331 0.914 0.000 
NZL PRT SPN SWE SWZ UKI USA AVG MAVG EAVG CAVG NAVG 
Mean NA NA NA 3.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 NA 2.400 2.481 1.436 1.136 
Median NA NA NA 3.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 NA 2.438 2.467 1.400 1.000 
Maximum NA NA NA 3.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 NA 2.750 2.667 2.000 2.500 
Minimum NA NA NA 3.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 NA 2.188 2.267 1.200 1.000 
Std. Dev. NA NA NA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 NA 0.118 0.108 0.197 0.438 
.---
Refer to table 2 for notes on these figures. 
v 
Table 6. Individual sample statistics for total union density 
AUS AUT BEL CAN DNK FIN FRA GER IRE ITA JPN NLD NOR· 
Mean 0.513 0.592 0.609 0.304 0.715 0.676 0.178 0.386 NA 0.441 0.309 0.359 0.619 
Median 0.512 0.585 0.672 0.311 0.726 0.769 0.196 0.385 NA 0.507 0.321 0.387 0.628 
Maximum 0.545 0.635 0.704 0.336 0.839 0.945 0.230 0.416 NA 0.574 0.348 0.418 0.640 
Minimum 0.473 0.510 0.465 0.251 0.602 0.342 0.082 0.365 NA 0.273 0.238 0.271 0.570 
Std. Dev. 0.020 0.033 0.091 0.028 0.094 0.191 0.046 0.014 NA 0.112 0.035 0.053 0.022 
NZL PRT SPN SWE SWZ UKI USA AVG MAVG EAVG CAVG NAVG 
Mean NA NA NA 0.819 0.334 0.462 0.228 NA 0.472 0.413 0.271 0.266 
Median NA NA NA 0.828 0.339 0.442 0.260 NA 0.480 0.430 0.278 0.269 
Maximum NA NA NA 0.974 0.386 0.544 0.294 NA 0.509 0.450 0.292 0.295 
Minimum NA NA NA 0.674 0.251 0.361 0.138 NA 0.431 0.366 0.232 0.223 
Std. Dev. NA NA NA 0.100 0.031 0.046 0.054 NA 0.028 0.032 0.018 0.022 
Refer to table 2 for notes on these figures. 
VI 
Table 7. Individual sample statistics/or the tax wedge 
AUS AUT BEL CAN DNK FIN FRA GER IRE ITA JPN NLD NOR 
Mean 0.227 0.449 0.391 0.298 0.349 0.472 0.495 0.456 0.211 0.510 0.248 0.503 0.405 
Median 0.230 0.433 0.395 0.299 0.351 0.515 0.476 0.488 0.199 0.482 0.225 0.547 0.443 
Maximum 0.354 0.567 0.577 0.479 0.517 0.712 0.672 0.562 0.377 0.702 0.374 0.607 0.527 
Minimum 0.121 0.305 0.236 0.156 0.145 0.231 0.323 0.339 0.068 0.413 0.149 0.321 0.201 
Std. Dev. 0.077 0.087 0.097 0.094 0.125 0.147 0.116 0.075 0.106 0.079 0.078 0.091 0.101 
NZL PRT SPN SWE SWZ UKI USA AVG MAVG EAVG CAVG NAVG 
Mean NA 0.243 0.340 0.531 0.336 0.349 0.352 0.358 0.398 0.403 0.225 0.325 
Median NA 0.192 0.301 0.556 0.368 0.371 0.363 0.364 0.410 0.410 0.225 0.331 
Maximum NA 0.624 0.663 0.776 0.405 0.463 0.465 0.511 0.536 0.570 0.333 0.472 
Minimum NA 0.111 0.113 0.264 0.244 0.203 0.234 0.211 0.246 0.237 0.134 0.195 
Std. Dev. NA 0.147 0.173 0.166 0.059 0.092 0.080 0.096 0.095 0.107 0.065 0.086 
Refer to table 2 for notes on these figures. 
VII 
Table 8. Unemployment rates estimated by instrumental variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Emp Protection (xl 00) -0.156** -0.099* 
{0.067} {0.056} 
Replacement Rate (xl 00) -0.466* -0.290 
{0.279} {0.253} 
Tax Wedge (xl 00) 5.030*** 2.925** 
{1.405} {1.150} 
Union Density (xl 00) -0.263 0.698 
{0.596} {0.617} 
(Un)Coordination (xIOO) -0.140* -0.010 
{0.072} {0.065} 
Benefit Duration (xl 00) 0.043 
{0.035} 
L: Lagged Variables (xl 00) I 83.618*** 85.348*** 85.324*** 85.012*** 84.109*** 86.071 *** 85.705*** 
{2.356} {2.137} {2.136} {2.173} {2.362} {2.058} {2.l05} 
Time Dummies i(29) 163.208 221.611 219.386 211.195 209.974 165.240 228.232 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
R2 0.935 0.934 0.933 0.934 0.933 0.935 0.934 
Durbin-Watson 1.994 1.981 1.982 1.985 1.982 1.986 1.986 
Standard errors in brackets. NlImber of observations: 464. 
VIII 
Table 9. Testing for robustness 
Variable Complete 1960-1976 1977-1992 Europe Step Data 
Benefit Duration (xl 00) 0.043 0.047 0.027 0.058 0.064* 
{0.035} {0.031} {0.053 } {0.042} {0.034} 
(Un)Coordination (xl 00) -0.140* -0.125 -0.l10 -0.205** -0.141 * 
{0.072} {0.089} {0.091 } {0.084 } {0.074} 
Emp Protection (xl 00) -0.l56** -0.213*** -0.089 -0.128* -0.005 
{0.067} {0.082} {0.113} {0.073 } {0.026} 
Replacement Rate (xl 00) -0.466* -0.054 -0.763* -0.654** -0.103 
{0.279} {0.311} {0.401 } {0.297} {O.l53} 
Tax Wedge (xIOO) 5.030*** 5.509*** 3.984** 5.070*** 4.375*** 
{l.405} {1.673 } {2.036} { 1.459} { 1.330} 
Union Density (xl 00) -0.263 -0.965* 0.443 -0.730 -0.308 
{0.596} {0.563} {0.943} {0.589} {0.564} 
L Lagged Variables (xl 00) 83.618*** 87.254*** 81.035*** 81.042*** 85.531 *** 
{2.356} {3.021 } {3.326} {3.056} {2.078} 
Time Dummies i\29) 163.208 76.280 70.279 136.028 160.020 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
R2 0.935 0.880 0.853 0.944 0.935 
Durbin-Watson 1.994 1.853 1.893 2.006 1.986 
# Observations 464 192 272 348 464 
IX 

Table 10. Interaction effects 
Additive E.ffects Aml!Rfication Effects Both: Additive Both: Aml!.i{fication 
Variable NLLS IV NLLS IV NLLS IV LS IV 
Benefit Duration (x / 00) 0.040 0.062* 13.007* 13.522 0.031 0.095** 16.827* 6.525 
{0.030} {0.034} {7.343} {11.715} {0.025) {0.039} {8.986} {6.l21} 
(Un)Coordination (xl 00) -0.042 -0.141 * -20.569** -23.547 -0.044 -0.341 ** -24.128* 3.997 
{0.045} {0.074 } {10.589} {21.673 } {0.048} {O.l30} {13.206} {18.475} 
Emp Protection (xl 00) -0.012 -0.012 -26.743*** -25.225*** 0.035 ·0.019 -33.590*** -24.843*** 
{0.027} {0.027} {4.741} {6.81l} {0.024} {0.026} {6.263 } {7.640} 
Replacement Rate (xl 00) -0.169 -0.176 56.853 41.284 -0.224 0.005 90.607* -31.902 
{0.152} {0.152} {39.096} {58.891} {0.199} {O.l67} {51.915} {47.139} 
Tax Wedge (xl 00) 3.349*** 4.441 *** 53.448 -58.303 2.984*** 4.857*** 36.541 -94.684 
{l.I12} {1.326} {122.314} { 136.750} {0.542} {1.228} {I26.682} { 178.667} 
Union Density (xl 00) -0.038 -0.297 347.275*** 539.211 *** -0.366 -0.680 441.264*** 384.484*** 
{0.030} {0.566} {100.496} {179.261} {0.5I8} {0.663} {130.042) {124.239} 
L: Lagged Variables (x/~O) 85.353 85.237 91.002 88.496 86.424 81.416 86.424 81.416 
R2 0.936 0.935 0.942 0.936 0.945 0.920 0.945 0.920 
Durbin-Watson 2.000 1.986 1.933 1.776 1.955 1.591 1.955 1.591 
Standard errors in brackets. Number of observations: 464. 
XI 
